INDONESIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT’S DECISION NO. 97/PUU-XIV/2016: A CHANCE TO ENCOURAGE RECONCILIATION BETWEEN “AGAMA” AND “KEPERCAYAAN” by Ruswanda, Asep Sandi
RELIGI: JURNAL STUDI AGAMA-AGAMA
Vol. 16, No. 1, Jan-Juni 2020, pp. 18-41
p-ISSN: 1412-2634 I e-ISSN: 2548-4753
http://ejournal.uin-suka.ac.id/ushuluddin/Religi/article/view/2269
DOI: https://doi.org/10.14421/rejusta.2020.1601-02
Submitted on 06/12/2020; peer-reviewed on 06/20/2020 & 06/21/2020; revised on 06/27/2020; published on 06/28/2020
_________________________________________________________________________________________
INDONESIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT’S DECISION NO. 97/PUU-
XIV/2016: A CHANCE TO ENCOURAGE RECONCILIATION BETWEEN
“AGAMA” DAN “KEPERCAYAAN”
Asep Sandi Ruswanda*
Abstract
This paper discusses the Constitutional Court’s decision No. 97/PUU-XIV/2016 as a
chance to encourage reconciliation of “agama” and “kepercayaan.” This paper collects
responses from religious organizations through statements on the internet such as online
media, the organization’s official website, or even official social media. The data is then
classified based on religious affiliation and their attitude towards the Constitutional
Court’s decision No. 97/PUU-XIV/2016. On 7 November 2017, the Constitutional
Court granted a judicial review of Law No. 23/2006 amended by Law No. 24 of 2013
concerning Civic Administration (UU Adminduk). This law is very significant for the
group of “kepercayaan.” However, the group of “agama” has not yet fully accepted the
group of “kepercayaan.” So, there needs to be reconciliation between groups of “agama”
and “kepercayaan” after the Constitutional Court’s decision No. 97/PUU-XIV/2016. By
looking at the importance of the decision, it is also truly an opportunity to stop
discrimination and social stigma against followers of “kepercayaan.” This paper
concluded that the Constitutional Court’s decision No. 97/PUU-XIV/2016 was an
opportunity to encourage reconciliation between “agama” and “kepercayaan.”
Keywords: Agama, Constitutional Court’s decision, Kepercayaan, reconciliation
A. Introduction
In the interreligious dialogue in Indonesia, it emphasizes recognized religions.
Here, I call them “agama” groups. Unfortunately, the facts of religious phenomena are
more diverse than just these religious groups. The impact is that several groups are
excluded from the interreligious dialogue. One of the most significant groups is
“kepercayaan” groups although they are indigenous religions whose existence is much
earlier in Indonesia than recognized religions which incidentally are “imports.”
The exclusion of the “kepercayaan” groups from dialogue in Indonesia is because
they have not received legal recognition since the proclamation of the Indonesian state.
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Furthermore, it is a consequence of polarization between “agama” and “kepercayaan”
groups since pre-independence. It implies that “agama” groups object to “kepercayaan”
groups. Thus, “agama” as an entity recognized by the state, perceives groups of
“kepercayaan” outside the part of interreligious dialogue as they are marginalized legally.
In the sense that there is no juridical basis to protect their existence.
Although there is no law in Indonesia, or even the Constitution, which defines
“agama”, in practice, the term “agama” refers to world religions in Indonesia based on
the explanation of Law No. 1/PNPS/1965 concerning Blasphemy.1 Based on the
evidence in the history of religions in Indonesia, Law No. 1/PNPS/1965 mentions that
Indonesian only embraces Islam, Christianity, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and
Confucianism. It then becomes the justification of “agama” groups that are legalized by
the state to “exclude” groups of “kepercayaan” in interreligious dialogue. For instance, in
the Indonesian Inter-religious Communication Forum (Forum Komunikasi Umat
Beragama or FKUB), groups of followers of “kepercayaan” and other minority religions
such as Baha’i, Shinto, and so on, they did not get a position because they did not get
recognition from the state.
Nevertheless, the debate between “agama” and “kepercayaan” gets a new leaf
when, on November 7, 2017, the Indonesian Constitutional Court (Mahkamah
Konstitusi or MK) granted a request for judicial review on the rules for emptying the
religious column for followers of the “kepercayaan” on the Family Card (Kartu Keluarga
or KK) and electronic ID Card (Kartu Tanda Penduduk elektronik or KTP-el) regulated
in Article 61 verse (1) and (2) and Article 64 verse (1) and (5) of Law Number 23 of 2006
concerning Civic Administration as amended by Law Number 24 of 2013 concerning
Law concerning Amendment to Law Number 23 of 2006 concerning Civic
Administration (UU Adminduk).2 By looking at the Constitutional Court’s decision No.
97/PUU-XIV/2016, it provides a new step for the group of “kepercayaan.” On the one
hand, this is a significant decision for followers of the group of “kepercayaan” because
1 Zainal Abidin Bagir, “Kepercayaan” dan “Agama” dalam Negara Pasca-Reformasi,” Prisma 39,
no. 1 (2020): 43, LP3S.
2 Prianter Jaya Hairi, “Tindak Lanjut Putusan MK Terkait Penganut Kepercayaan,” Info Singkat IX,
no. 23. (2017): 1.
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they can fill in “kepercayaan” in the religion column of their Family Card and electronic
ID Card. On the other hand, it is also important to see how the responses of official
religious leaders to the Constitutional Court’s decision. Here, I assume that the decision
of the Constitutional Court No. 97/PUU-XIV/2016 which was decided in 2017 (the
Constitutional Court’s Decision in 2017) has a chance to reconcile the relationship
between “agama” and “kepercayaan” in the religion-making dialogue in Indonesia.
Although several papers discuss the issuance of the Constitutional Court’s decision
No. 97/PUU-XIV/2016, no one has discussed the response of religious organizations to
create a dialogue between “agama” and “kepercayaan” groups. For example, Sukirno and
Adhim’s research focuses on the implementation of the Constitutional Court's decision
No. 97/PUU-XIV/2016 for the indigenous community, specifically for the indigenous
community of Adat Karuhun Urang in Cigugur Kuningan.3 While Azizah sees the
Constitutional Court’s decision No. 97/PUU-XIV/2016 based on an Islamic perspective.
She considers that it is in line with the contents of the Medina Charter which upheld
religious freedom. She sees momentum for the implementation of al-Daruriyyat al-Khams
Li Hifz al-Din (five important needs that must be maintained by the Muslims).4 Another
research is a master’s thesis written by Wahyudi which states that “agama” and
“kepercayaan” are different values of beliefs. He views that the Constitutional Court’s
decision No. 97/PUU-XIV/2016 reduced the value of “agama” as a divine revelation
that must have prophets and scriptures as guidelines for his religious life.5
Based on this background, this paper aims to find out how religious organizations
respond after the issuance of the Constitutional Court’s decision No. 97/PUU-
XIV/2016 whether they accept, reject, or give a moderate attitude. Then, this paper will
3 Sukirno and Nur Adhim, “Implementasi Putusan Mahkamah konstitusi No. 97/PUU-XIV/2016
pada Masyarakat Adat Karuhun Urang di Cigugur,” Jurnal Penelitian Hukum De Jure 20, no. 1 (2020): 11,
http://dx.doi.org/10.30641/dejure.2020.V20.11-24.
4 Imroatul Azizah, “Menakar Jaminan Implementasi Al-Daruriyyat Alkhams Bagi Penghayat
Kepercayaan Dalam Keputusan Mahkamah Konstitusi,” Annual Conference for Muslim Scholars (AnCoMS):
806.
5 Moh. Wahyudi, “Analisis Masuknya Aliran Kepercayaan di Kolom Agama dalam Kartu Keluarga
dan Kartu Tanda Penduduk (Studi Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Nomor 97/PUU-XIV/2016 tentang
Yudicial Review Undang-Undang Administrasi Kependudukan)” (Master Thesis, Universitas Islam
Indonesia, Yogyakarta, 2018), xiv.
R E L I G I:
JURNAL STUDI AGAMA-AGAMA Vol. 16, No. 1, Jan-Juni 2020, 18-41
_________________________________________________________________________________________
Asep Sandi Ruswanda: Indonesian Constitutional Court’s Decision No: 77/PUU-XIV/2016: A Chance to …
DOI: https://doi.org/10.14421/rejusta.2020.1601-02.
21
also look at how the chance to encourage reconciliation between “agama” and
“kepercayaan” groups through the Constitutional Court’s decision No. 97/PUU-
XIV/2016 in interreligious dialogue.
This paper is a qualitative study in which primary data is collected through
literature studies such as books, journals, and other related sources. Besides, this paper
collects responses from religious organizations through statements on the internet such
as online media, the official website of the organization, or even official social media.
The data is then classified based on religious affiliation and analyzed descriptively. These
data then become the results of the research in this paper.
This paper will show the diversity of the attitudes of religious organizations in
responding to the Constitutional Court’s decision No. 97/PUU-XIV/2016. The paper
argues that “agama” groups have not yet fully accepted the decision so there must be a
dialogue between “agama” and “kepercayaan” groups. Furthermore, this is also a chance
to reconcile the polarization of “agama” and “kepercayaan” groups which have
historically occurred even since Indonesia’s pre-independence.
B. A Brief History of Polarization of “Agama” and “Kepercayaan”
Religion is a prescriptive and normative term not a descriptive or analytical term.
Its emergence is understood as a controversial Eurocentric phenomenon, specifically,
Christian theology and western modernity that predominantly influence the term
“religion”, which is then used universally.6 The definition of religion also influences the
political construction of religion-making in Indonesia. In Indonesia, “religion” is then
translated as “agama.” Because when we speak “agama” in Indonesia, we cannot ignore
the problem of the definition of “religion” with certain standards that have been brought
by the West, it is inevitable. Consequently, “[…] both religion and agama are defined and
standardized. Definitions of religion/agama standardize what may (and may not) be
categorized as religion and agama. Those resembling the prototyped religion/agama, but
6 Michel Picard, “Introduction: ‘Agama,’ ‘Adat,’ and Pancasila.” In The Politics of Religion in Indonesia:
Syncretism, Orthodoxy, and Religious Contention in Java and Bali, edited by Michel Picard & Rémy Madinier
(London: Routledge, 2011), 1.
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not fully fulfilling the required standards are excluded, and may not enjoy the status of
being recognized as religion.”7
The term “agama” is the result of borrowing from Sanskrit. Nevertheless, in
Indonesia, it was changing and shifting meaning. In Sanskrit, the original term “agama”
refers to “a traditional precept, doctrine, body of precepts, collection of such doctrines”
or simply “agama” is “anything handed down as fixed by tradition.” Furthermore, the
ancient Javanese call it for “a body of customary law or a Dharma-book, and to religious
or moral tradition.” The shifting meaning occurs when Islam and Christianity take over
and adopt the meaning of “agama” even though the meaning of “agama” tends closely
to the idea of “dharma” in India. Here, “the legal and religious components of agama
became dissociated in Indonesia […] By taking on the meaning of ‘religion’, religion was
not only dissociated from ‘law’ but also from ‘tradition’, which is rendered by the
traditional Arabic loan word adat.”8
Here, the definition of “agama” (religion) in Indonesia is problematic. In a sense, it
is not only a translation fallacy but also it is a political construction which from the
beginning has marginalized and excluded many groups through standards imported from
Islam and Christianity. As a result, the definition of “agama” (religion) in Indonesia has
separated what is called “agama” (religion) and “non-agama” (non-religion) including
“kepercayaan.” Related to the term “kepercayaan,” Maarif mentions that followers of
“kepercayaan” and indigenous peoples are part of followers of “agama leluhur”
(indigenous religion). Not all followers of “kepercayaan” and indigenous peoples are
followers of indigenous religion due to various considerations. For example, it is an
assumption that “adat” (customary)/“kepercayaan” practice is culture, it is not religion.
In Indonesia, indigenous religions are often referred to interchangeably with the terms
“agama leluhur,” “agama asli,” “agama lokal,” “agama nusantara,” and even often
identified with local wisdom. This term has only been popular since the Reformation
7 Samsul Maarif, “Indigenous Religion Paradigm: Re-interpreting Religious Practices of
Indigenous People,” Studies in Philosphy 44 (2019): 4, http://doi.org/10.15068/00155157.
8 Picard, Introduction, 484-485.
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era.9 Meanwhile, “kepercayaan” is also defined as the indigenous religions of Indonesia.
It is an indigenous system of spirituality that does not mix with other religions.10
“Kepercayaan” can be grouped into two namely first, the propomelayu group. This group
can be called “pure” groups. In a sense, the “kepercayaan” groups that continue to exist
today without being influenced by religions come from outside. Second, it is the
deutromelayu group that has been “mixed.” This group emerged and developed among
world religions. Although formally the religions that came from outside replaced
“kepercayaan” groups, the spiritual elements of the “kepercayaan” groups still existed
(incognito).11
The history of polarization of “agama” and “kepercayaan” in Indonesia cannot be
separated from the politics of religion that has occurred since the Dutch colonial era.
According to Maarif, politics of religion is a political effort by groups of citizens who
make religion a tool of legitimating power and control over other citizens’ groups. The
political effort was carried out through mobilization and mass pressure with claims in the
name of the interests and identity of the majority religion, the strength of political parties,
state infiltration through policies, and legislation.12 At the end of the 19th century, the
Dutch colonial government issued a policy of differentiating Islam (agama) vs. adat
(kepercayaan). Colonies are divided and distinguished. As a result of this policy, adat
which was institutionalized became exclusively different from religious institutions, and
religious/Islamic groups in turn considered not only Dutch colonizers but also adat
groups as enemies because they were considered to be allied with the invaders.13
Towards the independence of the Indonesian state, debates between religion and
“kepercayaan” continued. Fundamental questions such as whether religion and
“kepercayaan” are equal, or whether “kepercayaan” is the part of religion or separate;
and the political situation that occurred at that time made this debate colored by many
9 Samsul Maarif, Pasang Surut Rekognisi Agama Leluhur dalam Politik Agama di Indonesia (Yogyakarta:
Center for Religious and Cross-cultural Studies (CRCS), 2017), 3-4.
10 Rachmat Subagya, Agama Asli Indonesia (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan dan Yayasan Citraloka, 1981), 1.
11 Rachmat Subagya, Agama Asli Indonesia, 28-31.
12 Maarif, Pasang Surut, 1.
13 Maarif, Pasang Surut,12-13.
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things. It became important because at that time Indonesian leaders were developing a
constitution. The debates can be illustrated in the atmosphere during the drafting of the
constitution by the Indonesian Independence Preparatory Agency for Investigation
(Badan Penyelidik Usaha-Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia or BPUPKI). On
July 13, 1945, when the draft Working Committee’s constitution was completed, religion
became part of one of its articles, namely Article 29 which consists of 2 verses: “(1)
Negara berdasarkan pada Ketuhanan, dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariat Islam bagi
pemeluk-pemeluknya; (2) Negara menjamin tiap-tiap penduduk untuk memeluk dan
menjalankan sesuai agama dan kepercayaannyan itu” (1) The State is based on God, with
the obligation to carry out Islamic law for its followers (as stated in the Jakarta Charter);
(2) The State guarantees each resident to embrace and carry out according to that
religion and belief). The word “kepercayaan” or belief itself in this verse is the proposal
of Mr. KRMT Wongsonegoro, who is a member of the Small Committee on the Design
of the Constitution and later became Chairman of the Indonesian Kebatinan
Coordinating Board (Badan Koordinasi Kebatinan Indonesia or BKKI), at the BPUPKI
meeting on July 13, 1945. Wongsonegoro sees that he certainly has an interest in
guarding the aspirations of the threatened abangan group as a target of the possibility of
coercion of Islamic law. The abangan group proposes verse 2 because they realize that the
existence and aspirations of their group will be threatened by the santri group agenda.
They consider that verse 1 is very potential to be forced. Therefore, verse 2 is a way to
anticipate if the first verse carried by the santri group will be forced on the abangan
group.14
In the New Order era, the polemic of the abangan group was not excluded by the
state. The government made a policy to conduct “building up” religion against abangan
groups. The state claims the correct interpretation of Article 29 of the Constitution is
that every citizen must embrace one of the five state-recognized religions namely Islam,
Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, and Buddhism. Confucianism is not included
because when the new order the government issued Presidential Instruction No. 14 of
14 Maarif, Pasang Surut, 19-20.
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1967 which prohibits all things Chinese-affiliated. Then, in 1973, the government made a
policy that all students receive two hours of religious subjects whose contents are
standardized by the Department of Religion. Students from families who do not follow a
recognized religion are forced to choose one of the recognized religions.15
In the post-independence era, the root of the conflict between the “agama” group
and the “kepercayaan” group was, first, the state did not recognize “kepercayaan” as a
religion in the Minister of Religious Affairs Regulation No. 9 of 1952 (Peraturan Menteri
Agama or Permenag No. 9/1952) which defines religion as a monotheistic belief system,
has a holy book that is believed to be a revelation, and also has a prophet. Next, the
second regulation was the issuance of Presidential Decree No. 1/PNPS/1965, which
was later stipulated to become Law No. 1/PNPS/1965, which is often regarded as a
source of problems with indigenous religious resistance. This law itself was issued when
the political tension between the Nahdatul Ulama Party (Partai Nahdlatul Ulama) and
the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia or PKI) was heating up
and increasing.16 In the era of Sukarno and Suharto, policies towards religion were
delegated to the bureaucracy rather than the judiciary. Indonesian bureaucrats are
involved in ensuring and defining religion. As a result, the government forced religions
such as Hinduism and Buddhism that were considered polytheistic to be included in the
monotheistic category.17 “The formalization of “agama” and regularities of the
formalized “agama” has consistently been appropriated to legitimate the adoption of
often violent measures targeting religious minorities in Indonesia.”18
According to Sukirno, in Dwipayana, the issuance of Presidential Decree No.
1/1965 colonized “kepercayaan” group. In many cases, the government tried to impose
15 Robert W. Hefner, “Where have all the abangan gone? Religionization and the decline of non-
standard Islam in contemporary Indonesia.” In The Politics of Religion in Indonesia: Syncretism, Orthodoxy, and
Religious Contention in Java and Bali, edited by Michel Picard & Rémy Madinier, (London: Routledge, 2011),
84-85.
16 Sukirno, “Diskriminasi Pemenuhan Hak Sipil Bagi Penganut Agama Lokal.” Administrative Law
& Governance Journal 1, no. 3 (2018): 236.
17 Yüksel Sezgin and Mirjam Künkler, “Regulation of Religion and the Religious: The Politics of
Judicialization and Bureaucratization in India and Indonesia.” Comparative Studies of Society and History, 56,
no. 2 (2014): 471. https://doi:10.1017/S0010417514000103.
18 Sita Hidayah, “The Politics of Religion: The Invention of “Agama” Indonesia,” Kawistara, 2, no.
2 (2012): 121.
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its will on the “kepercayaan” group by classifying it to a certain “agama.” For instance,
making Tolottang’s indigenous religion (kepercayaan) in South Sulawesi a Hindu religion
based on the Decree of the Minister of Religious Affairs No. 6 in 1966 (SK Menteri
Agama No. 6 tahun 1966). Also, the Kaharingan indigenous religion which was
integrated into Hinduism based on the Decree of the Regional Office of the Ministry of
Religious Affairs of Central Kalimantan No. MA/203/1980 (SK Kakanwil Departemen
Agama Kalimantan Tengah No. MA/203/1980). Discrimination of followers of the
“kepercayaan” groups then continued when The People’s Consultative Assembly
(Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat or MPR) Decree No. IV/MPR/1978 (Tap MPR No.
IV/MPR/1978) was published on the Broad Guidelines of State Policy (Garis-Garis
Besar Haluan Negara or GBHN), which emphasized that “Kepercayaan kepada Tuhan
Yang Maha Esa” (literally, Belief in God Almighty) or “kepercayaan” was not a religion,
so it needed to be fostered so as not to lead to the formation of new religions. It has
implications for civic administration matters. Circular of the Minister of Home Affairs
No. 477/4054 (SE Mendagri tahun 1978) dated 18 November 1978 stated that the
religion recognized by the government was Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism,
and Buddhism—Confucianism not mentioned because the government issued
Presidential Instruction No. 14 of 1967 which prohibits all things Chinese-affiliated.
Thus, the religious column of the followers of “Kepercayaan kepada Tuhan Yang Maha
Esa” and others are only written “hyphen” (-). Circular of the Minister of Home Affairs
in 1978 continued until the issuance of Law No. 23/2006 which was amended by Law
No. 24 of 2013 concerning Civic Administration (UU Adminduk).19
In 2016, Nggay Mehang Tana, Pagar Demanra Sirait, Arnol Purba, and Carlim
then submitted a request for a judicial review of this Law with Case Number 97/PUU-
XIV/2016. The Panel of Judges led by the Chairman of the Constitutional Court, Arief
Hidayat, finally granted all the judicial review requests a year later.
19 Sukirno, “Diskriminasi,” 237.
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C. Responses of Religious Organizations to the Constitutional Court’s
Decision No. 97/PUU-XIV/2016
In the verdict, the panel of judges granted the petition for a review of Law No.
23/2006 which was amended by Law No. 24 of 2013 concerning Civic Administration
with Case Number 97/PUU-XIV / 2016 as a whole. They stated that the word “agama”
article 61 section (1) and Article 64 section (1) of the Civic Administration Law
contradicted the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia and had no binding
legal force as long as it did not include “kepercayaan.” Then, they also stated that Article
61 section (2) and Article 64 section (5) of the Civic Administration Law (UU Adminduk)
contradicted the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia and did not have
binding legal force.
This decision then received a lot of responses from elements of society. Of course,
one important element of the response is the religious organization in which they have a
large grassroots mass base and a long history of contesting with “kepercayaan” groups
since the colonial era. Interestingly, the attitude of the religious organization is not
singular. Based on their leaders’ statements, the attitudes of religious organizations can
be classified into three attitudes, namely, first, it is the positive attitude, which supports
this decision using either legal or theological arguments. Then, the second is neutral.
This attitude tends to only accept legal decisions without significant resistance or support.
The last is the negative attitude. This attitude tends to expressly show their
disappointment with the decisions of the Constitutional Court judges. These statements
are the responses of the leaders of religious organizations based on the background of
religious organizations while officially only the Council of Indonesian Ulama (Majelis
Ulama Indonesia or MUI) gives an official statement to the public.
Related to the Constitutional Court’s Decision No. 97/PUU-XIV/2016, MUI
national working meeting decides eight points. First, MUI deeply regrets the
Constitutional Court’s decision, the Constitutional Court’s decision is considered
inaccurate and hurts the feelings of religious people, especially Indonesian Muslims
because the decision means aligning the position of “agama” and “kepercayaan.” Second,
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MUI considers that the Constitutional Court’s decision has legal consequences and has
an impact on the order of social life, as well as damaging the state and political
agreements that have been going well. Third, MUI believes that the Constitutional Court
should make decisions that have a strategic, sensitive impact and concern the lives of
many people, build communication and absorb the broadest aspirations from the society
and stakeholders, so that they can make decisions objectively, wisely, and aspiratively.
Fourth, MUI respects the religious and beliefs diversity of every citizen because it is an
implementation of Human Rights protected by the state following applicable laws. Fifth,
MUI agreed that the implementation of civil rights services of citizens in law and
government should not be any difference and discrimination, as long as this is following
statutory provisions. Sixth, concerning civil rights as citizens, the fostering of the
“kepercayaan” followers so that they remain under the Ministry of Education and
Culture, as has been going well so far. Seventh, because the Constitutional Court’s
decision is following the constitution, is final and binding, the MUI proposes to the
government that the “kepercayaan” followers be given KTP-el which includes a column
of “kepercayaan,” without any “agama” column. Eight, the making of KTP-el for the
followers of the “kepercayaan” should be immediately realized to fulfill the rights of
citizens who are included in the category of “kepercayaan.”20
Table 1. Responses of Leaders of Religious Organizations to the Constitutional Court’s
Decision No. 97/PUU-XIV/2016.
Figure Organization Religion Attitude
Gomar Gultom Persekutuan Gereja-gereja di
Indonesia (PGI) (Communion of
Churches in Indonesia (CCI))
Protestantism Positive
Din Syamsuddin Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI)
(The Council of Indonesian
Ulama)
Islam Negative
Ma’ruf Amin Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI)
(The Council of Indonesian
Islam Negative
20 Fitri Wulandari, “8 Pernyataan Sikap MUI Tanggapi Putusan MK Terkait ‘Pencantuman Kolom
Aliran Kepercayaan di e-KTP’,” Tribunnews, Januari 17, 2018,
https://www.tribunnews.com/nasional/2018/01/17/8-pernyataan-sikap-mui-tanggapi-putusan-mk-
terkait-pencantuman-kolom-aliran-kepercayaandi-e-ktp.
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Ulama)
Masduki Baidlowi Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) Islam Neutral
Robikin Emhas Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) Islam Neutral
Abdul Mu’ti Muhammadiyah Islam Positive
Yunahar Ilyas Muhammadiyah Islam Negative
Haedar Nashir Muhammadiyah Islam Negative
Suresh Kumar Perhimpunan Pemuda Hindu
(Peradah) (The Hindus Youth
Association)
Hinduism Negative
Haryadi Perwakilan Umat Buddha
(Walubi) (Indonesia the
Indonesian Buddhist Council)
Buddhism Neutral
Positive attitude came from PGI and Muhammadiyah. Gomar Gultom, Secretary-
General of PGI, said that “it is a step forward because the state thus recognizes the
rights of all people to be included in their “agama”/”kepercayaan” in the KTP-el column,
no longer just one of the six religions that have been recognized so far.” Furthermore,
he, as the representative of PGI, expressed his gratitude to all groups for fighting for it.
PGI is one of the organizations that has supported the advocacy of “kepercayaan”
groups from the beginning. He stated that since the beginning PGI participated in
various ways to fight for the rights of indigenous peoples and indigenous religions, even
when it was still in the legislative process of discussing the Civic Administration Bill, but
it was always outvoted. Also, when submitting Judicial Review Law number
1/PNPS/1965, it was also rejected at the Constitutional Court. He then explicitly said
that “all of you [followers of “kepercayaan”] are the legitimate and original owners of
this Republic, even long before the arrival of the six religions that have been recognized
to the archipelago.”21
Then, Abdul Mu’ti, Secretary-General of Muhammadiyah, considered that the
Constitutional Court’s decision was very strategic for followers to “kepercayaan.” He
said that advocates of “kepercayaan” lost many civil rights, particularly those related to
religious rights. Furthermore, he said that there were a number of things that needed to
be done regarding the life of “kepercayaan.” First, the data collection regarding followers
21 Markus, “Sekum PGI: Keputusan MK Terkait UU Adminduk Sebuah Langkah Maju,” PGI,
November 10, 2017, https://pgi.or.id/sekum-pgi-keputusan-mk-terkait-uu-adminduk-sebuah-langkah-
maju/.
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of “kepercayaan”—there is no need to limit between recognized or unrecognized
“kepercayaan.” Second, it is necessary to change policies related to public services such
as civic administration, marriage, and religious education22
Meanwhile, figures such as Din Syamsuddin and Ma’ruf Amin from MUI gave
negative attitudes. In addition, Muhammadiyah shows more heterogeneous responses.
Yunahar Ilyas gave a negative attitude in responding to the Constitutional Court’s
decision No. 97/PUU-XIV/2016, it was different from Mu’ti’s attitude which gave a
positive response.
The Chairman of the MUI consideration Council, Din Syamsuddin, said that he
strongly complained of the Constitutional Court’s decision on “kepercayaan”. He
disagreed if “kepercayaan” was equated with “agama” (religion). He then referred to the
interpretation of MPR Decree No. 4/78 “that “kepercayaan” is not “religion” and
cannot be equated with “religion.” As the Chairman of the MUI consideration Council,
he also saw signs and symptoms of distortion, deviation from the interpretation of the
constitution. Syamsuddin said, “[...] although the Constitutional Court has the authority
to have an interpretation even the decision is final and binding, the Constitutional Court
cannot arbitrarily provide interpretations that are contrary to existing national
agreements.”23
The MUI Chairman, Ma’ruf Amin, also criticized the Constitutional Court’s
decision on “kepercayaan.” He said that the Constitutional Court’s decision on
“kepercayaan” did not take into account society agreements. He said “the Constitutional
Court made a decision that merely adhered to the principles of legislation, without
paying attention to the agreement in the life of the nation and state. It was the problem.”
The agreement in question is that one element of the identity of every citizen in
Indonesia is “agama,” not “kepercayaan.” According to Amin, it will cause turmoil if the
22 Idealisa Masyrafina, “Muhammadiyah Dukung Putusan MK Terkait Kolom Agama di KTP-El,”
Republika, November 7, 2017, https://republika.co.id/berita/oz1sqt354/muhammadiyah-dukung-putusan-
mk-terkait-kolom-agama-di-ktpel.
23 Wildansyah Samsudhuha, “Wantim MUI Sesalkan Putusan MK yang Anggap Kepercayaan
Setara Agama,” Detik, November 22, 2017. https://news.detik.com/berita/d-3738186/wantim-mui-
sesalkan-putusan-mk-yang-anggap-kepercayaan-setara-agama.
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“kepercayaan” of a citizen, it will be included in the KTP-el or KK because there is a prior
political agreement.24
In contrast to Mu’ti who gave a positive attitude, Yunahar Ilyas, Chairman of the
Tarjih, Tajdid, and Tabligh Muhammadiyah Central Executive, said that he questioned the
reason the Constitutional Court granted the petitioner’s claim regarding the
permissibility of “kepercayaan” followers to fill the religion column on the KTP-el. He
worried that it would have a big impact on the future following the Constitutional
Court’s decision. According to Ilyas, Muhammadiyah considered that the followers of
the “kepercayaan” should not need to be included in the religion column on the KTP-el.
He said “kepercayaan” is not “religion,” how can it be written in the religion column on
the KTP-el? What should have been written was one of the recognized religions in
Indonesia.”25
The negative attitude also came from the statement of the General Chairman of
the Muhammadiyah Central Executive, Haedar Nashir, who considered the
Constitutional Court’s authority to exceed God’s authority. He believes that the Court
today is the most powerful institution in Indonesia. He was worried that there would be
a big impact in the future following the Constitutional Court's decision. According to
Nashir, the Court cannot be free from interests. In addition to the matter of
interpretation, he stated that the relationship between the judges and their background
strongly determines the decision. The Constitutional Court’s decision about the
permissibility of writing followers of “kepercayaan” in the column of KTP. Nashir
considers that the Constitutional Court should be more careful and comprehensive to
judges and it had also to use the sociology of religion.26
24 Fabian Januarius Kuwado, “Ketum MUI Kritik Putusan MK soal Penghayat Kepercayaan,”
Kompas, November 15, 2017. https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2017/11/15/16000091/ketum-mui-
kritik-putusan-mk-soal-penghayat-kepercayaan
25 Abdul Aziz, “Muhammadiyah Khawatir Penghayat Kepercayaan Masuk Kolom Agama KTP,”
Tirto, November 8, 2017, https://tirto.id/muhammadiyah-khawatir-penghayat-kepercayaan-masuk-kolom-
agama-ktp-czQt.
26 Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, “Soal Putusan MK tentang Aliran Kepercayaan, Ketum:
Otoritas MK Melebihi Otoritas Tuhan,” UMM, November 12, 2017,
http://www.umm.ac.id/id/muhammadiyah/12564.html.
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Responding to the Constitutional Court’s decision No. 97/PUU-XIV/2016, the
NU religious organization gave neutral attitudes. It is implied from the statements of
figures such as Masduki Baidlowi and Robikin Emhas. Masduki Baidlowi, Deputy
Secretary-General of the Nahdlatul Ulama Executive Board (Pengurus Besar Nahdlatul
Ulama or PBNU) said that, according to Islamic teachings, “kepercayaan” is not
included as “agama” but Baidlowi did not question if “kepercayaan” was written in the
religion column of KTP-el and KK. He himself was worried that the decision would lead
to new conflicts. He did not deny that there could be clashes at lower levels. However,
he hoped that would not happen. According to Baidlowi, another impact that needs
attention is the reduced number of people (recognized religions). During this time, many
followers of “kepercayaan” decided to embrace state-recognized religion, including Islam,
in order to obtain state facilities. Nevertheless, after this decision, NU had to rethink
how to invite followers of “kepercayaan” to become fully Muslims. It is a new challenge
for NU to invite followers of “kepercayaan” to Islam.27
Robikin Emhas, Chairman of the PBNU said that he should respect the
Constitutional Court’s decision for followers of “kepercayaan.” According to Emhas, the
Indonesian constitution has guaranteed equal rights and position before the law and the
government. Therefore, as Indonesian citizens, followers of “kepercayaan” should not
be discriminated against by the state. He hopes the Indonesian citizens can respect the
Constitutional Court’s decision. Moreover, the Constitutional Court’s decision is final
and binding so every citizen in the Republic of Indonesia should respect it
[Constitutional Court’s decision].”28
Meanwhile, the General Chairperson of the National Board of Leaders of the
Hindus Youth Association (Perhimpunan Pemuda Hindu or Peradah) and the
Indonesian Buddhist Council’s Public Relations Staff (Perwakilan Umat Buddha
27 Andrian Pratama Taher, “PBNU Sebut Putusan MK Tidak Koordinasi dengan Kementerian
Agama,” Tirto, November 9, 2017, https://tirto.id/pbnu-sebut-putusan-mk-tidak-koordinasi-dengan-
kementerian-agama-czRN.
28 Mabruroh, “NU Hormati Putusan MK untuk Penghayat Kepercayaan,” Republika, November 9,
2017, https://www.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/politik/17/11/09/oz5071-nu-hormati-putusan-mk-
untuk-penghayat-kepercayaan.
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Indonesia or Walubi) responded to the demographic impact of the followers of
Hinduism and Buddhism post-the Constitutional Court’s Decision No. 97/PUU-
XIV/2016. Suresh Kumar, Chairperson of the National Board of Leaders of the Hindu
Youth Association, said that Hinduism is the religion most affected by the Constitutional
Court’s Decision No. 97/PUU-XIV/2016 because the majority of “kepercayaan” groups
have so far joined Hinduism. He said that it happened because the “kepercayaan” groups
thought that they had a lot in common with Hinduism. So, he assumed that the
publication of the Constitutional Court’s Decision No. 97/PUU-XIV/2016 will make
followers of Hinduism less. Yet, Haryadi, Walubi’s Public Relations Staff said that he did
not bother with the publication of the Constitutional Court’s Decision No. 97/PUU-
XIV/2016. He said that the decision had little effect on Buddhists because
philosophically he said that “Buddhism is Buddhism. It is just that the teachings are
different.”29
Table 2. Responses of Religious Organizations to the Constitutional Court’s Decision
No. 97/PUU-XIV/2016.
Organization Religion Attitude
PGI Protestantism Positive
MUI Islam Negative
NU Islam Neutral
Muhammadiyah Islam Positive and negative
Peradah Hinduism Negative
Walubi Buddhism Neutral
Based on the three religious organizations’ responses to the Constitutional Court’s
decision No. 97/PUU-XIV/2016, only PGI clearly gave a positive attitude. MUI and
Peradah gave a negative response. And, NU and Walubi chose to give a neutral attitude.
Muhammadiyah provides a multivocal attitude. On one hand, Abdul Mu’ti gave a
positive attitude. On the other hand, Yunahar Ilyas and Haedar Nashir gave a negative
attitude. Nevertheless, if we ask all members of organizations such as PGI, MUI, NU,
29 Mufti Sholih, “Dampak Putusan MK untuk Agama-Agama di Indonesia,” Tirto, November 8,
2017, https://tirto.id/dampak-putusan-mk-untuk-agama-agama-di-indonesia-czQe.
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Peradah, and Walubi either structural active members or cultural sympathizers, of course,
the response will also be as varied as the Muhammadiyah religious organizations.
Besides, there is a correlation between the statement of the leaders of religious
organizations and the official statement of religious organizations. For example, in the
MUI case, the eight points of the official MUI attitude and the attitude of MUI figures
show the same attitude. They give a negative attitude. These religious leaders are people
who are not only organizational leaders but also religious leaders who have great
influence and many followers at the grassroots level so that their voices can influence
their organizational attitudes both formally and informally.
The positive, negative, and neutral attitudes of religious organizations show that
“agama” groups are not yet fully the same in viewing the issue of “kepercayaan.” It is a
result of the process of the politics of religion that has taken place since Indonesia was
not yet independent. So, the issuance of the Constitutional Court’s decision No.
97/PUU-XIV/2016 is a great chance to encourage reconciliation of “agama” and
“kepercayaan” groups.
D. The Chance to Encourage Reconciliation between “Agama” and
“Kepercayaan”
According to Brounéus, “reconciliation is a societal process that involves mutual
acknowledgment of past suffering and the changing of destructive attitudes and behavior
into constructive relationships toward sustainable peace.”30 Bloomfield views then that
“reconciliation is a complex term, and there is little agreement on its definition. He said
that “[...] reconciliation is both a goal—something to achieve, and a process—a means to
achieve that goal.”31
In the case of conflict between groups of “agama” and “kepercayaan” here, the
term “reconciliation” emphasizes justice for the rights of both—not just to one. It is
because the history of conflict between groups of “agama” and “kepercayaan” is the
30 Karen Brounéus, Dialogue on Globalization: Reconciliation and Development (Berlin: the Friedrich-
Ebert-Stiftung, 2007), 6.
31 David Bloomfield, Terri Barnes, and Luc Huyse (Eds.), Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: A
Handbook. (Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2003), 12.
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history of injustice. Brounéus viewed that “justice is indispensable for reconciliation.”32
It can be said that many laws tend to accommodate more the interests of groups of
“agama,” particularly Islam, Protestantism, and Catholicism. Consequently, the conflict
tends to discriminate against groups “kepercayaan.” Law No. 1/PNPS/1965 (UU PNPS),
the People’s Consultative Assembly Decree No. IV/MPR/1978 (Tap MPR), and Law
No. 23/2006 which was amended by Law No. 24 of 2013 concerning Civic
Administration (UU Adminduk) is evidence of how the group “agama” which is the
majority group “defeats” the group of “kepercayaan” at the state level. In Minutes of
Session No. 97/PUU-XIV/2016 on May 3, 2017. Samsul Maarif, one of the Petitioners’
Experts, said that laws such as the Civic Administration Law discriminate and perpetuate
social stigma in society.
“The most important thing is the Civic Administration Law like this, today
the state still perpetuates social stigma. “Kepercayaan” in 1965, [was accused
of being] communist. In 1978, “kepercayaan” [was considered as] culture,
not a religion, they [are accused] of threatening the state. What is done today
with the Civic Administration Law, it continues to perpetuate social stigma.
Even this social stigma becomes a social norm, even a legal norm used to
consider whether these citizens are served or not.”
He then mentions several cases, for example when followers of “kepercayaan”
want to get service from the state, they first get questions such as “who is your prophet?
What is your holy book?” According to Maarif, it is a social stigma that is built from the
beginning which has been embedded in the heads of civil servants in providing services.
It is what is meant by social stigma as social norms, even legal norms. These things are
utilized by groups of “agama” that have a mission to spread religion. Here, Maarif views
that followers of “kepercayaan” are always victims of discrimination and social stigma.33
Many followers of “kepercayaan” convert to recognized religions because they do
not want to always be victims of discrimination and social stigma, especially during the
New Order era in which followers of “kepercayaan” were accused of being part of
communism. At that time, in 1965, followers of “kepercayaan” were accused of having
no religion. Thus, they convert to recognized religions to defend themselves.
32 Brounéus, Dialogue on Globalization, 8.
33 Risalah Sidang Perkara No. 97/PUU-XIV/2016, 6.
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Consequently, there was a significant decrease in followers of “kepercayaan” and an
increase in followers of Islam, Catholicism, and Protestantism during this period.
Moreover, Islam and Christianity both Catholicism and Protestantism are also religions
that aim to proselytize (in Bahasa, dakwah or misi). Proselytization includes all attempts to
try to persuade someone to a particular religion and religious community to
conversion.34
In Surakarta, where there were 13 “kepercayaan” groups registered with a total of
15,068 followers. Followers affiliated with “kepercayaan” continued to decline as in
1974-1975. Official statistics reported that “other” group—groups that do not have
affiliations with Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and
Confucianism have decreased from 39,396 to 19,879 while Muslims, Catholics, and
Protestants have increased respectively from 334,889 to 340,496, from 38,688 to 40,548,
and from 42,552 to 45,668. According to Ricklefs, this might occur because “[...] as well
as government suspicion and suppression and Islamic antipathy, there may have been
internal psychological causes for the decline of kebatinan early in the New Order. The
occult doctrines of kebatinan movements commonly include the idea that advanced
practitioners acquire superhuman abilities, but not always for positive purposes.”35 In the
contemporary era, another possibility is since the Islamic movement such as Salafism in
Surakarta seems to be more attractive to people from “kepercayaan” backgrounds since
it is simple, rigid, clear rules, and transnational character give it an additional appeal of
cosmopolitanism. So, Islam becomes more dominantly than the “kepercayaan” group.36
By looking at the many discriminations and social stigma against followers of
“kepercayaan,” the Constitutional Court’s decision No. 97/PUU-XIV/2016 is a chance
to encourage reconciliation of groups of “agama” and “kepercayaan.” Reconciliation
itself can be examined from three levels of society, namely top-level, middle-range, and
34 Melissa Crouch, Law and Religion in Indonesia: Conflict and the Courts in West Java (New
York, NY: Rutledge, 2014), 6.
35 M. C. Ricklefs, Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java: A Political, Social, Cultural and Religious History,
C. 1930 to the Present (Singapore: NUS Press, 2012), 133-134.
36 Martin van Bruinessen (Ed.), Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam: Explaining the
“Conservative Turn” (Singapore: ISEAS, 2013), 15.
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grassroots. Top-level emphasis is on accountability and the legal system. Then, the
second is the middle-range. It is an example of the actors being NGOs. Lastly, it is
grassroots. It can be done by holding meetings between grassroots leaders to build
collaboration.37 Thus, reconciliation between groups “agama” and “kepercayaan” has to
involve all levels of society so that there is no more discrimination and social stigma
against “kepercayaan” groups. For instance, religious organizations that respond
negatively to the Constitutional Court’s decision No. 97/PUU-XIV/2016 must be
invited for dialogue in order to accept “kepercayaan” groups in those religious
organizations.
Furthermore, when we talk about reconciliation there are instruments that must be
carried out to achieve it. First is healing. “Healing is a process or activity that improves
the psychological health of individuals.”38 It is important because discrimination and
social stigma, then social norms and even legal norms, have been around for a long time.
Just imagine, since Indonesia gained independence in 1945, followers of “kepercayaan”
have just gained legal recognition in 2017. It would certainly require healing. Second, it is
justice. “Reconciliation and justice are almost twin notions. The search for peaceful
coexistence, trust, empathy, and democratic power-sharing demands that “justice be
done.”39 Of course, in a democratic system like Indonesia where there is a lot of diversity,
reconciliation for justice is a necessity. Next, it is truth-telling. In the reconciliation
process, truth-telling is one of the most significant steps.40 To build good relations in the
future between groups of “agama” and “kepercayaan,” truth-telling must be done so that
further generations can avoid bad history and learn from past processes. Lastly, it is
reparation. “Reparation is a key element of any true transitional justice and reconciliation
process [...] The term “reparation” is the most comprehensive notion that covers a wide
range of measures that are taken to redress past wrongs which may or may not qualify as
human rights violations and/or as criminal offenses.”41 Mistakes of action in the history
37 Brounéus, Dialogue on Globalization, 6.
38 Bloomfield, Barnes, and Huyse (Eds.), Reconciliation after Violent Conflict, 77.
39 Bloomfield, Barnes, and Huyse (Eds.), Reconciliation after Violent Conflict, 97.
40 Bloomfield, Barnes, and Huyse (Eds.), Reconciliation after Violent Conflict, 122.
41 Bloomfield, Barnes, and Huyse (Eds.), Reconciliation after Violent Conflict, 145.
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of the debate on “agama” and “kepercayaan” should no longer be repeated in the future.
Followers of “kepercayaan” must get their rights equal to followers of “agama.” The
Constitutional Court’s decision No. 97/PUU-XIV/2016 is an example of a form of
reparation group of “kepercayaan” that must be supported by all elements of society.
So, it is important to have a dialogue between groups of “agama” and
“kepercayaan” in order to religious organizations that provide negative and neutral
attitudes when they respond to the Constitutional Court’s decision No. 97/PUU-
XIV/2016 turn into positive attitudes. The Constitutional Court’s decision No.
97/PUU-XIV/2016 is a great opportunity to eliminate, or at least reduce, the
discrimination and social stigma that happens to followers of “kepercayaan.” Here,
reconciliation between groups of “agama” and “kepercayaan” plays an important role.
Although the Constitutional Court’s decision No. 97/PUU-XIV/2016 has not been
positively accepted by religious organizations, it is really a great opportunity to bring the
“kepercayaan” group back into the daily religious conversation. In a sense, they are not
perceived as unbelievers, communists, backward people, and other stigma attached to
them After the Constitutional Court’s decision No. 97/PUU-XIV/2016, now is a chance
of all elements of society to encourage reconciliation between groups of “agama” and
“kepercayaan.”
E. Conclusion
The history of polarization of “agama” and “kepercayaan” is a history of injustice
from the colonial era to the reform era. After the Indonesian state was formed, the
contestation of “agama” and “kepercayaan” was further sharpened. On the one hand,
groups of “agama” get better portions of rights because they get legal recognition. On
the other hand, the groups of “kepercayaan” are increasingly excluded. For example,
Law No. 1/PNPS/1965 (PNPS Law), the People’s Consultative Assembly Decree No.
IV/MPR/1978 (MPR Decree), and Law No. 23/2006 which was amended by Law No.
24 of 2013 concerning Civic Administration (UU Adminduk) are evidence that the
group of “kepercayaan” is a victim of politics of religion. The Laws discriminate against
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groups of “kepercayaan.” Furthermore, it then becomes a social stigma, which becomes
a social norm and even a legal norm.
In 2017, the Constitutional Court then granted all the judicial review requests for
Case Number 97/PUU-XIV/2016 to Law No. 23/2006 which was amended by Law No.
24 of 2013 concerning Civic Administration. The decision implies that followers of
“kepercayaan” today can fill in the religion column on their identity cards. Responding to
this, several religious organizations gave their attitude. PGI provides a positive attitude.
Then, MUI gave a negative attitude and NU showed a neutral attitude. Muhammadiyah
gave a multivocal attitude in which Abdul Mu’ti gave a positive attitude, while figures
such as Yunahar Ilyas and Haedar Nashir gave a negative attitude.
Based on the responses of the religious organizations, the group of “agama” still
does not fully accept the group of “kepercayaan.” So, there needs to be reconciliation
between groups of “agama” and “kepercayaan” after the Constitutional Court’s decision
No. 97/PUU-XIV/2016. By looking at the significance of the decision, it is also really a
chance to stop discrimination and social stigma against followers of “kepercayaan.” In
short, the Constitutional Court’s decision No. 97/PUU-XIV/2016 is an opportunity to
encourage reconciliation between “agama” and “kepercayaan.”
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